This research explores the usability of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) online Public Inspection Files to measure the sources and quantities of political advertising on broadcast television. We compared data from FCC files with data purchased from a commercial vendor in a presidential caucus campaign that stretched across nine months, including advertising sponsored by over 40 groups and totaled tens of millions of dollars. The FCC-derived and commercial data were consistent in reporting the quantity of advertising, but sponsor identification was inconsistent between data sources, raising concerns about the FCC's ability to disclose reliable information about political ad spending. 
The US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC sharpened concerns about the dominant role that corporate wealth and special interests can play in the electoral process through financing political advertising. 1 The Citizens United ruling invalidated parts of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002) and was contrary to the Court's previous decisions in McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. Although the Court's decision in Citizens United found restrictions on the amount of corporate spending on election campaigns to be unconstitutional, it let stand disclosure provisions in order to provide information to voters. Consequently, the quality of publicly accessible data about political advertising is of critical importance to understanding 1. See Blevins; Levi; and Levitt. 
Transparency in Political Advertising

Jay Newell
Iowa State University
Jeffrey Layne Blevins
University of Cincinnati
Assessing the Utility and Validity of the FCC's Online Public Inspection File System the role that corporations and other private interests play in the electoral process.
One of the remaining forms of public oversight of financial influence 2 in political advertising is the FCC's requirement that broadcasters disclose information about their political ad sales through each broadcast station's online Public Inspection Files. It is important to more fully understand the accessibility and accuracy of this information. The study that we present here focused on advertising during the Iowa caucuses to test the usefulness and validity of the FCC Public Inspection Files as a source of political advertising data. We compared data derived from the FCC with data purchased from a commercial vendor, Kantar's Campaign Media Analysis Group, for $19 million of advertising spending over 9 months by 40+ political advertisers. This is the first comprehensive, peer-reviewed study of FCC-derived data and offers critical insights for public interest groups, campaign finance reform advocates, and media researchers.
Measuring Political Advertising: Federal Election Commission, Kantar, and the FCC For media researchers and public interest groups, the usefulness and validity of political advertising spending measures are both key factors to understanding the power that money plays in the election process. Although there are multiple sources of data for researchers to collect political advertising data, including two federal commissions and a private company that tracks political advertising, there are significant limitations to each, including lack of detail, cost, and usability of the data. In this section, we examine how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and Kantar Media's Campaign Media Analysis Group measure political advertising in election campaigns and the limitations of both sources. Additionally, we explore the potential for the FCC's public file system as a free alternative source of data for researchers who want a detailed gauge of spending on political advertising. Table 1 provides a comparison of the three sources by data origins, units of analysis, media covered, media not covered, costs, and timeliness. The primary purpose of requiring disclosure in political advertising was to reduce deception and other forms of corruption in the electoral process without inhibiting political speech or campaigning.
Such disclosure requirements survived a constitutional challenge in Buckley v. Valeo as the Court reasoned that disclosure requirements are the least restrictive means affecting political speech by providing information to voters about which interest groups that elected officials are most likely to be receptive toward while in office.
The level of detail within the FEC reports tends toward the vague. Candidates and committees can choose to fill in a "purpose of disbursement" field with any level of specificity. The FEC accepts "brief but specific" descriptions of disbursements such as "advertising-radio, TV, newspaper, or print" as meeting its disclosure requirements. 4 There are no requirements to disclose the number of ads or when the ads were run. Additionally, if the disbursement was made to a representative firm that sells advertising time on multiple media entities, then the station or channel receiving the advertising funds are not necessarily identified. In spite of the low degree of specificity, the FEC files have been used for political science research.
5 However, the lack of detail in FEC filings seems to preclude its use in all but the most large-grained analyses. Arguably, the FEC filings are better employed for reviews of strategic political decisions, and of limited use for explorations of campaign tactics.
3. See Federal Election Campaign Act. 4. See Federal Election Commission. 5. For instance, Stratmann used FEC filings, as well as industry-data on advertising rates, to establish the efficacy of advertising purchases in congressional races. Hernnson also used FEC data to estimate overall media spending in congressional elections.
Data Source: Kantar Media Campaign Media Analysis Group
The dominant 6 supplier of political advertising data in the United States is the Washington-based Campaign Media Analysis Group of Kantar Media (hereafter referred to as "Kantar"). 7 Owned by the world's largest advertising-agency-holding company, London- Kantar tracks political advertising in the United States on network television, local television, network cable television, and radio. Their coverage area includes the 210 Nielsen markets, plus Manchester, New Hampshire, during the presidential primary season.
Kantar does not publish a description of its advertising monitoring mechanism. However, discussions with Kantar personnel and a review of the data provided indicate that Kantar electronically monitors web feeds of television broadcast stations with software separating program content from advertising. The advertising content is broken into discrete spots, with a digital example of each different spot linked to a database. Kantar reports 26 variables for each spot, including the station name, program title, date and time of air, and spot length. Some of the more subjective elements of each spot are derived through human coding. Coders at Kantar review the spot, assign the name of the advertiser (e.g., "American Future Project"), a campaign (e.g., "President"), an issue ("Faith/Religion"), and a tone ("Positive"). Each spot is assigned an estimated cost. From discussions with Kantar personnel, the estimated cost is derived from discussions content. 16 The video content that Kantar archives with the data was used to track the proportion of male versus female narrations in campaign ads. 17 Recently, Kantar was one of the data streams in a "Big Data" approach to political incivility in social media.
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The FCC's Station Public Inspection File system
Because the broadcast medium has historically been the key mechanism by which candidates and political groups get their messages to voters, the FCC has oversight over an important aspect of political ad spending that falls under the Communications Act (1934). The FCC collects information on political advertising purchases made on licensed broadcast television stations in the United States in accordance with the Communications Act, which requires that broadcast stations provide reasonable access and equal opportunities for candidates running for federal office to purchase advertisements. However, the "equal opportunities" rule provided in Section 315 of the Communications Act does not provide an equal amount of advertising time for all candidates running for the same office. What the law does require is that stations make available the same opportunities (length of ad, day part, cost, etc.) to all legally qualified candidates running for the office. For example, if a television station sells a block of 60-second ads in primetime to one candidate, it has to be willing to sell the same number of ads, at the same length, for the same cost to other candidates in that race.
Specifically, FCC rules 73.3526(e)(6) and 73.3527(e)(5) require that television and radio stations keep a file of "all requests for specific schedules of advertising time by candidates" and issue advertisers, as well as information about when the ads actually aired "as soon as possible, which the Commission has determined is immediately absent extraordinary circumstances."
19 The information is provided by the stations and consists of requests for airtime by candidate committees, National Association of Broadcasters affidavits self-certifying the organization as representing a political entity, and the advertising contracts as generated by the station or the station's sales representation firms.
16. See Fowler, Ridout, and Franz. 17. Strach et al. 18 . See Hopp and Vargo. 19 . FCC, About Public Inspection Files.
The requests, affidavits, and contracts are uploaded to the FCC Public Inspection File system in Adobe PDF format. Although the PDF format allows viewers to inspect the documents using any computer, the opportunity for automated data interpretation is limited. Additionally, the structure and file name of each document is up to the purchaser, the station, or the sales representative firm, further limiting the opportunity for automated data interpretation. As noted in its frequently asked questions, the FCC specifically declines to offer naming conventions for broadcasters' Public Inspection Files, stating: "there is no requirement that individual files be named in any particular way." 20 The absence of standardization makes interpretation of files more subjective and error-prone.
In a critique of the FCC's system for tracking political ad buys, the Center for Responsive Politics concluded that the agency's efforts were "useless" for the public to understand who was advertising. 21 The primary shortcoming of the FCC's public file system is that stations do not necessarily know how to code ads from interest groups, which leads to inconsistency and inaccuracy in the data. The FCC file structure provides a folder for "Non-candidate Issue Ads," and it's up to each station to determine what constitutes an issue ad. A further problem is that the FCC's file system is only searchable by station call letters, rather than a particular candidate or the entity purchasing ads. Together, these two problems make it a painstaking task to discover ad spending by 501(c) 4 groups, also known as "dark money." Because these groups do not register with the FEC, the only public mechanism to find dark money is through the FCC Public Inspection Files on a station-by-station basis.
Research Using the FCC File System
For decades, the FCC has required broadcast stations to maintain physical files that include documents such as applications, licenses, letters, Equal Opportunity reports, and key for this study, documents relating to political advertising. Until the FCC's mandated transition to the online system, the files were available to the public and researchers only in visits to the offices of the broadcast stations. The transition to the online Public Inspection Files 23 had the potential to increase the volume of research, as investigators could access the files without the time and expense of trips to stations. However, we were able to find only two studies that used the political files within the online FCC system as a data source. 24 
Research Questions
In sum, our review of the research based on the three data sources (FEC, Kantar, FCC) indicates an ongoing interest in tracking the sources and quantities of political advertising. FEC data is freely accessible, but reported in such a way as to limit its usefulness for measuring political advertising tactics. Kantar Media and the FCC Public Inspection Files are what remains. However, the reliance on purchased Kantar data, and the scant employment by researchers of freely available FCC data, indicates a perceived or actual lack of viability for the FCC Public Inspection File system as a source for research data.
Accordingly, this study explored the suitability of the FCC files for tracking political advertising. We first report the usefulness of the FCC Public Information Files as a research tool, evaluating the accessibility and cost of "free data" in terms of researcher time. We then explore the extent to which political ad data from the FCC and Kantar Media deliver consistent results, focusing on the source and amount of advertising purchased. If data can be extracted efficiently from the FCC system, and the data paint a valid picture of political advertising expenditures, researchers will have methodological and budgetary choices. 
Method: A Data Comparison Approach
This current research involves a comparison of broadcast commercial advertising source and quantity as uploaded to the FCC Public Inspection File system with Kantar Media's capture of presidential advertising for the same campaign and market. FEC data were not analyzed, as invoices could not be efficiently ascribed to a single market. We chose a single market and single time period: Des Moines, Iowa, during the nine months of advertising for 2016 Presidential Caucus. This market seemed appropriate for a test of source and quantity of political advertising, as the Iowa Caucuses host one of the largest numbers of candidates vying for inclusion in the later stages of the campaign, and those candidates, plus super PACs and other organizations, purchase enough advertising to saturate the broadcast schedule with political advertising, pushing out all but a limited amount of local advertising. 25 The multi-month campaign, the extensive number of candidates, political action committees and interest groups, as well as the number of ads run created an environment suitable for a test of the FCC's Public Inspection file system.
The coding of FCC Public Inspection Files was conducted in cooperation with the Investigative Reports unit of one of the state's newspapers, which used the data for a series of articles on political advertising spending in Iowa's eight Nielsen markets. Television call signs for each of the markets were determined using the Television Bureau of Advertising (TVB) markets and stations list. Advertising contracts from full-power broadcasting stations were entered. Excluded were public television stations, low power stations, station translators, and stations not selling advertising.
Contracts were entered for both candidate committees and noncandidate organizations. As many contracts were updated as the campaigns progressed, only the final version of each contract was analyzed.
A trained student coder inspected each contract, recording the contract number as applied by the advertising time seller, the advertiser, start/stop dates, gross cost, and number of spots. Coding for advertising running between June 1, 2015 and February 1, 2016, the date of the Iowa Presidential Caucuses, began in October 2015 and ran through the first week of February 2016.
The coders were assisted by a semiautomated Google Sheets spreadsheet. 26 Programming within the spreadsheet extracted the station name This research compared data extracted from the FCC station files with data purchased from Kantar for the purchasers of the ads, the number of ads purchased, the television stations running the ads, and the cost of the ads. 
Timeliness of FCC Data
The FCC does not set a deadline for stations to upload political advertising contracts, instead asking stations to upload contracts "as soon as possible," which an FCC document has interpreted as "immediately."
28 For this research, the lag time between contract availability and upload to the FCC was calculated as the difference, in days, between the start of the ads called for in the contract and the date of the upload to the FCC system. Among the 1175 contracts analyzed, upload dates ranged from 154 days in advance of first air to 147 days after the first spot in the contract aired. Overall, the 27. See Center for Responsive Politics. 28. See supra note 15. mean time to file was 10.2 days (standard deviation [SD] = 44.37). The two stations with the most contracts in the market each averaged less than a week, whereas stations with fewer contracts typically, but not always, were later in their uploads, with as much as a five-week lag (see Table 2 ).
The average ten-day lag between air and contract upload may have little impact upon academic researchers. Additionally, our analysis may have overstated the lag time, as we measured the time between air and the final revision of the contract. Contracts can be revised and uploaded multiple. Lag times might have been shorter had we analyzed the first upload, rather than the last. In sum, the FCC Public Inspection File system appears to provide timely data for all but the most time-sensitive research projects.
The Cost of Free FCC-Derived Data
The PDF files in the FCC system provide images of station documents. Extracting data from the image was a challenge. First, the coder had to find the most recent contract in a folder that contained multiple documents, including a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) questionnaire establishing the source and scope of the campaign, requests for airtime, invoices, and several revisions of the contract. There was no format standardization from contract to contract between and within stations. The PDF format and absence of standardization precluded using technology to capture the information locked within the contract, and required human review of each contract at each revision. Time constraints also limited the amount of information that could be captured from each contract. For instance, contracts typically included the names, dates, and times of the programs in which ads were scheduled to air, as well as the length of the ads. As the research program was interested in the source and quantity of political ads, and uninterested in scheduling issues, program information was not captured, and would likely have substantially increased the amount of time needed for entry of each contract. Coders were students drawn from a 32-person advertising media class. The course focused on political media, and data input and analysis were integrated into the syllabus. The class members were assisted by five politically interested students and two reporters from the collaborating newspaper's investigative reports team. For the entire project, students coded 3786 contracts for the eight markets. In a postcourse survey (N = 21, 58 percent response rate), students reported coding, on average, 62.6 files each (SD = 28.97). Each coder invested an average of 3 minutes per file on coding (SD = 2.63), with a range of 1-10 minutes per file.
Our initial research question focused on the viability of the FCC Public Inspection File system as a supplier of data for academic studies. Our experience, based on one long-running, multi-advertiser, multimarket, media-saturated campaign, was positive. Based on the three-minute data-entry average, the entire team of coders spent approximately 60 person-hours entering the FCC data. Although the coders were unpaid, had they been paid professional data-entry rates, the total cost would have been only a fraction of the purchase price of Kantar data.
Thus, in response to the first research question, data from FCC Public Inspection File system can be a viable choice for scholars for studies of broadcast television advertising in which the number of markets, the number of campaigns, and/or the amount of captured detail, are limited to a subset of races and markets in the United States.
The Validity of FCC-Derived Data
The second research question addressed the extent to which the FCC data is a valid representation of the source and amount of political advertising spending. The face validity of the measures, such as the source name on contracts, the call letters of the broadcaster, the number of ads purchased, and the cost of the ads, is high. The FCC-derived data and Kantar materials for the sources of advertising, number of ads, and the cost of the advertising were compared to assess the convergent validity of the FCCderived data. There is confidence among researchers, as evidenced by their continued use of Kantar data, that Kantar accurately represents political advertising activity. Accordingly, this research employed Kantar data as the comparison set to assess the validity of the FCC-derived data.
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The analytic process consisted of combining Kantar Media's presidential advertising report for the Des Moines market (28,738 records), delivered as an Excel file, with an Excel file containing the 1174 contracts derived from the FCC Public Inspection Files. Source (advertiser) names were reconciled for multiple candidates and organizations. Both Kantar and stations occasionally used unstandardized short titles for source names. For example, while Hillary Clinton's committee was officially titled "Hillary for America," Kantar Media listed "Clinton, Hillary," whereas television station contracts showed a mix of titles such as "Clinton for President" and simply "Clinton." For this analysis, source names were standardized to match candidate committees and organizations listed as advertisers by Opensecrets.org. In addition, several candidates and organizations failed to appear in both the 39-source Kantar Media database and the 32-source FCCderived data. For example, Kantar Media tracked spots from "Californians for Population Control," while advertising from that organization was not captured from the FCC-derived data. Combined, there were 43 unduplicated sources. All were retained for this analysis (see Table 3 ).
29. For a discussion of convergent validation, see Adcock and Collier. The number of ads and the cost of the ads as measured by Kantar and reported to the FCC were submitted twice, by source and station, to paired sample t-tests (Davis 1997) . Typically, t-tests are used to determine if two samples have different means. In this analysis, the absence of mean differences between the Kantar data and the FCC data was considered an indicator of convergent validity.
FCC and Kantar Data Statistically Indistinguishable
For the number of ads run by each of the 43 sources, paired samples t-tests found no significant differences at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) between the FCC and Kantar data for the number of ads purchased by each source (t = 0.663, ns) and the amount spent by each source (t = 1.357, ns). In terms of which of the five Des Moines stations ran the ads, paired sample t-tests showed no difference between FCC and Kantar for the number of ads run on each station (t = 0.264, ns) and the revenue generated by those ads (t = 0.454, ns). In sum, the lack of differences between the two sources, with Kantar data collected electronically on a per-spot basis and the FCC data collected manually on a per-contract basis, indicated a convergent validity for both data collection mechanisms (see Table 4 ).
Indistinguishable, But Not Identical
Although the Kantar and FCC-derived data are highly correlated, the differences in line-by-line results (See Table 3 This content downloaded from 129.186.176.218 on Tue, 15 Jan 2019 21:08:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms methodological challenges of measuring political advertising sources and quantities. The FCC-derived data recorded contracts for 29,213 spots, whereas the Kantar system captured just under 28,738 spots. For 33 of the 43 advertisers assessed during the caucus period, the difference between the FCC and Kantar data was less than 100 spots per advertiser. The fewer spots seen by Kantar versus contracted in the FCC data could be due to unreported spot cancellations. Overall, there were 17 cases in which the FCC data reflected more spots than seen by Kantar. Those could have been due to identification errors or cancellations not reported to the FCC. There were 23 cases in which Kantar reported more spots than contracted by the FCC. Those could be explained by identification errors, stations running more spots than contracted or making good for partial or interrupted runs of spots, or stations not reporting advertising buys. However, the difference between the total number of spots reported as purchased to the FCC and seen by Kantar amounted to 2 percent.
On occasion, there were larger discrepancies, most notably the 1556 spot difference for Marco Rubio's presidential committee. The FCCderived data listed 3358 ads as contracted, with only 1802 seen by Kantar's monitoring. The difference cannot be explained by miscoding super PAC spots, as the FCC and Kantar data were in close agreement for the Rubiosupporting super PACs, with a 53 spot underreporting to the FCC for the Conservation Solutions PAC and a 36 spot underreport to the FCC for the Conservative Solutions Project.
Turning to the dollar value of the spots, the FCC-derived data indicated almost 10 percent more spending than Kantar. The difference can be attributed in part to the data collection mechanisms. As television stations do not typically post rate cards and spot costs are dynamic, 30 Kantar estimates the dollar value of each spot captured by their recording system, using an undisclosed estimation mechanism. The FCC-derived data, based on amounts agreed to by the advertising sellers and purchasers, would be expected to be closer to actual spending than Kantar.
The most substantial divergence between the Kantar and FCC data is in the naming of advertisers (sources) in the presidential campaign. Although there was no question between Kantar and FCC for presidential committees, the numerous super PACs and interest groups represented a definitional challenge. Kantar identifies political spots, and assigns advertiser 30 . See supra note 20. names, through visual inspection of the advertising creative, whereas the FCC system is dependent on sources properly identifying their goals on paperwork filed with each station. The system is prone to identification errors, and identification of sources is at the heart of public monitoring of campaign financing. 31 For example, Californians for Population Growth was not captured by the FCC data, although Kantar recorded 134 ads. In general, both campaign committees and PACs purchasing small numbers of ads were more likely to be missed in the FCC data than by Kantar, with Rand Paul, George Pataki, and John Kasich among those with no reports to the FCC but a few airings captured by Kantar.
The FCC as a Data Supplier: Discussion and Limitations
This research explored the viability of the FCC Public Inspection File system as a data source for political science research. Accordingly, in our discussion we first review the usability of the system and the validity of its data. We then discuss the limitations of the FCC as a monitor of political advertising activity, and then outline the limitations of our analytic approach.
Based on the files from television broadcasters captured in this study, the FCC system provides a usable data source on political advertising activity on broadcast television. Reports in the form of PDFs of advertising purchase contracts uploaded from television stations can be interpreted by system users to show the source and amount of advertising.
The stations in this study did a commendable job of reporting political advertising purchases. Contracts were uploaded, on average, only a few days after the start of the advertising buy, and many were uploaded prior to the start of advertising. Our comparison between the FCC self-reported data and Kantar's machine-based monitoring indicates that the FCC system captured nearly all of the political advertising, with a portion of the difference explainable by difficulties in assigning and categorizing source names. The greater number of ads in FCC-derived data versus Kantar's monitoring indicates that stations are compliant in reporting purchases. Were stations failing to report political advertising purchases, we would expect to have seen lower numbers for ads from FCC-derived data versus Kantar's electronic monitoring. However, usability was constrained by the FCC's reliance on the PDF file format and the absence of consistency in contract formats. Each contract had to be reviewed by a human coder, increasing the time-cost and opportunity for coding error. However, even at commercial data-entry rates, the cost of hand-entering FCC data amounted to a fraction of the purchase price of Kantar data. Although Kantar data provides information, such as links to the advertising creative, that is unavailable in the FCC system, we concluded that the FCC system is a viable source for political advertising data.
Limitations of the FCC's Public Inspection Files
Although the difficulties in searching and interpreting PDF documents in the FCC file system have been discussed in this article and elsewhere, 32 there are a number of other shortcomings in the FCC's approach that undermine the principle of public transparency in who is financing political advertising during election campaigns.
The FCC's system is blind to political advertising purchased on a national level and then transmitted by local broadcasters. Because stations, not networks, report political purchases, there are no records in the FCC Public Inspection Files for network buys. In the past, most political advertising was purchased on a market-by-market basis, but in the recent presidential campaign substantial sums were spent on national advertising purchases. Kantar Media reported that candidates Trump and Clinton purchased over $86 million of national advertising through the end of October 2016, with an additional $33 million reported as "other," presumably super PACs, presumably with ads running on broadcast networks as well as cable television networks. 33 Because of the FCC's failure to track national broadcast advertising, an organization or individual can use the public airwaves to influence elections, but avoid public disclosure by purchasing advertising at the national level, rather than through local broadcast facilities. The absence of national-level disclosure fails to provide critical information to voters.
" 35 Although the FCC refused to take action, 36 the negative publicity generated by Sinclair's plan resulted in the station airing only parts of the biopic along with some pro-Kerry material to satisfy the equal opportunities provision of Section 315 of the Communications Act. Nonetheless, this example illustrates the importance of accurate disclosure and easy access to the FCC's file system so that researchers and the public can effectively track political ad spending.
A third limitation of the FCC data is the absence of digital advertising data. The FCC has limited jurisdiction over digital advertising, which is heavily used by political campaigns. 37 The media planning firm ZenithOptimedia claims that 2016 was the last in which television advertising spending on behalf of all advertisers exceeded digital advertising spending. Spending on digital products such as video, display, mobile, and search by all US advertisers overall outpaced television spending in 2017, and the trend is expected to continue. 38 The FCC is jurisdictionally blind to the digital flow of advertising that goes to websites, mobile telecommunications devices, as well as billboards and other forms of paid messages that go from sources to the electorate, because it is beyond the agency's scope of authority. For now, it is up to individual media organizations to disclose the sources of political advertising, such as the Facebook/Instagram plan announced in 2018 to provide an application program interface (API) for researchers and public interest groups to monitor ads tagged as "political." However, there are two salient limitations to Kantar data via the Wesleyan Media Project: timeliness and transparency. The Wesleyan Media Project releases data from Kantar after the conclusion of the following election cycle. Thus, advertising data from US Senate and House races are available following a two-year lag, the presidency are released after a four-year lag. If timeliness is a factor in a research program, the delayed availability of Kantar data via the Wesleyan Media Project may be a hindrance. The second limitation is the absence of disclosure by Kantar of its data collection methods. Kantar does not publish its methods for collecting data, nor their procedures for coding the source of the advertising.
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If transparency of data collection methods is of value, then the absence of detail on Kantar-based data may be a limitation.
Methodological Limitations
This project took advantage of the extensive political advertising activity that accompanied the 2016 Iowa Presidential Caucuses. The broadcast television stations in the Des Moines media market are experienced in handling the advertising-saturated political campaigns, and thus may be more compliant to FCC regulations than stations in markets where political advertising is less lucrative. Thus, the scale of advertising activities in the Des Moines media market may limit generalizability to other markets and campaigns.
We did not measure inter-coder reliability for this project, nor does Kantar report inter-coder reliability. Nor was there a mechanism to certify each FCC-derived entry. However, given the consonance between the two data sets, coder error seems to be a minor issue.
Our data collection ended a few days following the Iowa Caucuses. It is probable that ending the data collection at that time resulted in missing cancellation notices that were filed later with the FCC. Additionally, FCC rules are inconsistent in specifying the duty of stations to notify the FCC of cancellations, allowing stations to provide only the name of a contact person in lieu of cancellation notifications. It is possible that the absence of cancellation notices was the reason for the largest gap between FCCderived data and Kantar reporting in this study, advertising for candidate Marco Rubio. Contracts in the FCC-derived database indicated the purchase of over 3300 ads for Marco Rubio, whereas Kantar reported the runs of 1802 ads. In any case, the inclusion of cancellation notices filed after the end of the data collection would have served to increase the correlation between the FCC and Kantar's monitoring data.
Finally, the viability of the FCC system for political advertising data from radio stations, cable systems, and other distribution mechanisms was not explored in this study, and is a question for the future.
Conclusion
This research set out to explore the usability and validity of the FCC's Public Inspection File system as a source of political advertising data for information policy researchers, public interest groups, and others who are interested in knowing who is purchasing political advertising and how much they are spending. The FCC files are somewhat accessible, and the data derived from the FCC files match well to Kantar's station surveillance system.
The work done by broadcasters to upload contracts is not matched by the FCC system's use by researchers. As evidenced by the stream of research that references Kantar data, researchers want information on the source and quantity of political advertising. But with few exceptions, researchers have not accessed the FCC material. The FCC's failure to track national-level advertising, and its insistence on uploads of non-machine-readable documents, adds unnecessary opacity to the goal of transparency in the political use of national airwaves. bibliography
